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Darling has pledged not to use differences in global financial regulations to promote the City of London. That's nice - in fact some would say he has been doing more than that and making London somewhat less attractive - which to me doesn't matter much either way. Others, however, are not so legalistic. It is part of EU law that no EU state should seek to beggar its neighbours or create competitive advantages for its financial sector. Yet, The Mayor of London and other Conservative figures and supporters are saying the opposite that their priority must be to enhance the ttractiveness and competitive advantages of London. fact is they don't know how to do that and would be foolish to imagine that less regulation would do it. the matter is not so simply defined. Calculating the cost/benefits of regulation is business terms is very hard to do.
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The chancellor also made it clear that Britain’s decision not to follow either the proposed US banking levy or the “Volcker rule” (banning proprietary trading by, and hedge funds within, banks) was not an attempt to steal financial services business to London from New York. He said: “I don’t want someone coming to our country because they are avoiding some legitimate concern somewhere else.” This sounds good and good for Dublin!
The chancellor’s main purpose in Switzerland was to meet with banks and urge the all to hasten reforms of banking and global economic management, issues on which he sees backsliding in the G20 agenda. I defined the G20 agenda into 90 tasks, which others have picked up and now bandy about as what is to be done. But, many of the tasks require a lot of detailed work; they involve major changes to what is traded on or off exchanges, to ratings agencies, and not least building new regulatory oversight bodies and then bring in the rest of the world to be fully in agreement and participative. The macro-economic and macro-financial models to underpin all this are however totally not there, and have not been planned yet and those that are underway are game-theory network risk models for dealing with single bank failures - so we do not yet have any governmental efforts behind trying to understand the credit crunch and recession comprehensively in macro-model or macro-prudential model data terms. This means that many policy objectives cannot be followed with support of deep analysis that is globally competent.
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His comments reflect those aired yesterday by Angel Gurria, secretary general of the OECD, who may wonder whether the IMF that is at the heart of the G20 agenda has the firepower for the job and needs OECD in Paris with all its massive brainpower to weigh in too, who said: “I don’t think anything of substance has been done during the crisis to correct global imbalances. It was the crisis itself that reduced imbalances”. If she meant global imbalances in finance she is of course on another planet. She meant global trade imbalances that astute economists know lay at the root cause of the crisis. Trade flows are definitely like scattered jigsaw pieces thrown into disarray. It'll be some time before we see how those pieces fall and that is what is gnawing at the long nails of Forbidden City mandarins in Beijing as they scroll through their beautiful painting of economic statistics. on that no small matter see http://bankingeconomics.blogspot.com/ Time to sell east buy west?